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Introduction
The trend toward increased international integration results in higher capital and labor mobility, which, in turn, intensifies international competition for productive factors.
The competing countries can differ relative to their population size, their initial capital endowments or their level of institutional development. Do these disparities between the competing jurisdictions damage global social welfare? Important contributions that address capital tax competition between asymmetric jurisdictions, such as those of Bucovetsky (1991) or Wilson (1991) , demonstrate that larger countries choose higher tax rates than smaller countries because they face a relatively lower tax elasticity of capital and, hence, a lower marginal cost of public funds. As a result, equilibrium tax rates differ across states and lead to an inefficient allocation of capital (Wilson and In other words, an entrepreneur of type x 2 [0; 1] who moves abroad incurs a disutility kjx sj. Here, k > 0 is the unit cost of capital relocation, which will also be interpreted as the degree of international openness and jx sj is the "distance" between the border s and the entrepreneur of type x.
Firms
As in Pieretti and Zanaj (2011), we introduce a linear technology in the following way. Each individual in country j (j = S; L) is able to produce, with one unit of capital, y j = q + j units of one final good, where q is the output share determined by the private sector 2 and j is the fraction depending on a public investment in country j. We assume that the final good is sold in a competitive market at a given price normalized to one. Because firms are free to move, location choices must be considered. The capital owners will set up their activity where profit, net of taxes and moving cost, is highest. 1 It follows that the world population coincides with the population of firms. We could complicate the model by assuming that each firm is run by more than one person, but this would unnecessarily complicate the model without further insights. 2 We assume that q is large enough such that the net income of firms and the social welfare are always positive.
Assume without loss of generality that the capital owner x 2 [0; s] living in country S is indifferent toward producing at home or producing in the foreign country L if
where t S and t L are source-based tax rates levied on capital in countries S and L, respectively.
It follows that
If x > s; firms move from the larger country to the smaller one, while firms move from the smaller country to its larger rival if x < s:
Governments
We now assume that the jurisdictions of S and L are able to increase, by appropriate public infrastructure expenditures, the productivity of all the firms located within their . Each jurisdiction j (j = S; L) is supposed to maximize its total tax revenue 3 , net of public expenditures, by choosing the appropriate tax rate t j and infrastructure levels j . The government's objective functions are thus given by 
Competition in taxes and infrastructure
We now consider that the jurisdictions compete in taxes and infrastructure expenditures.
To that end, we analyze a two-stage game 4 . First, the governments choose the level of infrastructure non-cooperatively and then, set the tax rates. Finally, firms decide where to locate their businesses. We solve the game backwards.
Starting from the second stage, each government chooses the tax rate that maximizes its objective assuming the rival's rate is given. The first order conditions yield the following unique equilibrium in tax rates
After having substituted the above tax rates into the jurisdictions' objective functions, we can solve for stage 1 when governments compete for infrastructure expenditures S and L . Solving the first order conditions leads to the unique equilibrium infrastructure expenditures
Introducing (5) into (4) yields the equilibrium tax rates
Imposing j > 0; t j > 0 and x 2 (0; 1) requires that k > k = 2 3 . It is straightforward to see that, at equilibrium, the productivity of firms will be highest in the larger country and the tax rate will be lowest in the smaller country. Indeed, we have L S = 2k . In other words, the smaller country attracts a fraction of entrepreneurs coming from the larger jurisdiction by undercutting the 4 The choice of sequentiality follows from the rule that the most irreversible decision must be made first.
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rival's tax rate even if it can provide attractive infrastructure. The larger country tries to resist the capital outflow by providing more infrastructure than its small rival.
Size effect on social welfare
As in Zissimos and Wooders (2008), we define efficiency as the maximum level of surplus available to all individuals in the two economies
The two terms in the brackets include, respectively, the joint firms' profits 5 and joint tax revenues. The last term is the companies' relocation costs.
We can write more explicitly that
For analytical convenience, we decompose social welfare in net global production
Substituting the above equilibrium tax rates (6) and equilibrium public inputs (5) into (8), we obtain
It is interesting to discuss how the jurisdictions'size asymmetry can affect social welfare. First note that increased size asymmetry induces the smaller country to use tax-dumping in a more aggressive way. Indeed, the tax differential t L t S increases when s decreases. Accordingly, how do the competing jurisdictions change their attitudes toward infrastructure expenditures? Above we show that the large country reacts by augmenting its infrastructure supply in addition to lowering its tax rate, while the small country reduces its infrastructure expenditures. However, in the aggregate, infrastructure expenditures increase and as a result net global production ( @ 1 @s < 0) also increases. On the other hand, increasing size asymmetry exacerbates inter-jurisdictional competition and induces more capital to move. As a result, the welfare is negatively impacted (
> 0). However, the sum of the two just highlighted effects is uncertain and depends eventually on capital mobility.
When capital mobility is high ( k < k < b k , with b k = 
Conclusion
This paper shows that size disparity among competing economies has an ambiguous effect on overall social welfare when countries not only compete in taxes but also in infrastructures. The reason is that increasing size disparity impacts the intensity of interjurisdictional competition and thus influences the mix of policy instruments that are used to attract mobile capital. Basically, increased size asymmetry makes the smaller country more aggressive in undercutting its rival, and consequently, more firms will relocate their businesses. In standard tax competition models, relocation is uniquely wasteful as long as it does not induce (or is accompanied by) additional output creation.
